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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the discovery of DNA and its potential uses in the field of forensics,
countries across the world have been trying to find ways to use DNA testing
to their advantage. Often, this leads to unique and challenging legal
questions. In the United States, arrestee DNA legislation has proven to be a
controversial issue with just over half of U.S. states enacting laws for the
purpose of creating and maintaining DNA databases, and half the states
remaining without such laws.1 Meanwhile, the federal government also
collects arrestee DNA in certain cases.2 In many states this type of
legislation has been challenged as unconstitutional, despite advocates of such
data collection consistently lobbying for it across the nation.3 These
challenges have resulted in split decisions amongst state and federal courts
across the United States.4
Signaling the importance of the matter, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Maryland v. King, in which Maryland’s arrestee DNA
legislation was challenged as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
1
Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA From Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, 270
NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 18, 19 (2012).
2
DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006).
3
See Samuels et al., supra note 1, at 19.
4
See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the
collection of DNA from arrestees is constitutional, because arrestees have a diminished
expectation of privacy); United States v. Fricosu, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Colo. 2012)
(finding that arrestee DNA sample obtained upon probable cause for commission of a federal
felony is constitutional); United States v. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45333 (W.D.N.Y.
Feb. 14, 2011) (finding that “the government’s interest in accurate and rapid identifications
outweighs [the defendant’s] privacy interest in the collection and analysis of a DNA sample”);
Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Haskell v. Harris,
669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a motion to enjoin enforcement of California’s
arrestee DNA statute, noting that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in establishing a
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violation); United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D.
Cal. 2009) (upholding the constitutionality of DNA sample collection from those arrested
upon a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause for the commission of a felony);
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012) (taking DNA upon arrest involves two distinct
intrusions on a juvenile’s privacy); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Reptr. 3d 753 (2011), transferred
with direction to vacate, 302 P.3d 1051 (2013) (holding the California DNA Act, in requiring
felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample without independent suspicion, warrant, or grand
jury determination of probable cause, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment); In re Welfare
of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the Minnesota DNA arrestee
statute constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650
S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007) (collecting DNA from someone arrested for a violent felony does not
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation).
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guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 Petitioner Alonzo
King challenged his conviction for rape, claiming that it was based on an
unlawful search and seizure, as his DNA profile had been collected upon his
arrest for a separate, unrelated crime.6 In the majority opinion by Justice
Kennedy, the Court held that the collection of a DNA sample upon arrest for
a serious offense was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.7
Still, the Court’s opinion may be read quite broadly and does not answer
all of the questions about DNA collection legislation in the United States.
The debate forming around the collection and retention of DNA in the
United States may be illuminated by the actions of other countries that have
implemented similar laws. Many legislators attempt to strike a balance
between citizens’ rights to privacy and the legitimate state interests that are
served by arrestee DNA sampling and retention as they make a foray into
this area of forensic science. By taking note of what other countries have
already tried and what other courts have already deemed acceptable or
unacceptable, the United States could avoid some of the potential downfalls
of DNA sampling and retention.
The first country to implement a DNA databank system was the United
Kingdom, followed swiftly by other European nations and the United States.8
The U.K. began collecting and maintaining DNA profiles in their National
DNA Database (NDNAD) in 1995.9 This database was, until very recently,
the largest DNA database in the world, with roughly 5.5 million unique
profiles collected as of March 1, 2012.10 Proportionally, it is still the largest
database in the world and, numerically, is second only to the United States’
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which has over 6 million profiles

5

133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
Id. at 1965.
7
Id. at 1980. This case will likely have a lasting effect for decades to come and invites
exploration of many Fourth Amendment issues, but the focus of this Note is on DNA
collection and retention. It is for another day to explore the implications it will have on U.S.
privacy law and criminal procedure.
8
Duncan Carling, Note, Less Privacy Please, We’re British: Investigating Crime with
DNA in the U.K. and the U.S., 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 487, 492 (2008);
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL GLOBAL DNA SURVEY 2008
KEY FACTS (indicating that as of 2008, forty-two member-states employed a DNA database).
9
Carling, supra note 8.
10
Karen J. Maschke, DNA and Law Enforcement, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO
CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS,
AND CAMPAIGNS 45–50 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008).
6
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collected.11 Proponents of the widespread sampling of arrestee DNA profiles
and databases often point to the U.K. as the leading example of how to best
implement such systems and how advantageous they can be in aiding
criminal investigations and preventing crime.12
There have been several studies performed in the United States
documenting the purportedly advantageous uses of arrestee DNA
databases.13 One such study indicated that requiring the collection of DNA
profiles upon felony arrest rather than felony conviction could have
prevented sixty violent crimes, including fifty-three murders and rapes.14
The study stressed that the eight convicted persons studied had twenty-one
prior felony arrests between them, only seven of which were for violent
crimes.15 A similar Maryland study suggests obtaining DNA samples upon
arrest of three individuals charged with a burglary, a sex offense, or a violent
crime could have prevented twenty other crimes.16 One can infer from these
studies that in order for arrestee DNA sampling to best serve the public
interest, sampling should not be limited to samples taken upon arrest for
violent crimes, but should be extended to all felonies, as violent crimes are
often committed by people who have previously been arrested for nonviolent felonies. Undoubtedly, the collection, retention, and comparison of

11

National DNA Database Statistics, https://www.gov/uk/government/publications/nation
al-dna-database-statistics (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). As a point of clarity, the NDNAD
actually contains roughly 5.6 million DNA profiles, but that number also includes
approximately 1 million “duplicate” profiles from the same people, for various reasons, so the
number of unique profiles in the system is approximately 4.8 million.
12
Jay Siegel & Susan D. Narveson, Why Arrestee DNA Legislation Can Save Indiana
Taxpayers Over $60 Million per Year, 6–7 (Jan. 2009), available at http://dnasaves.org/files/
IN_DNA_Cost_Savings_Study.pdf.
13
See CITY OF CHICAGO, REQUIRING DNA FOR FELONY ARRESTS CAN SOLVE AND PREVENT
VIOLENT CRIMES. WAITING FOR CONVICTION CAN COST LIVES (2005), available at http://www.
dnasaves.org/files/ChicagoPreventableCrimes.pdf [hereinafter CHICAGO STUDIES]; MARYLAND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SYS., BALTIMORE CTY. POLICE DEP’T & MARYLAND STATE POLICE,
REQUIRING DNA FOR QUALIFYING ARRESTS IN THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION CAN SOLVE AND
PREVENT VIOLENT CRIMES (2008), available at http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Arr
estee_Database/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf [hereinafter MARYLAND STUDY]; WASHINGTON
STATE PREVENTABLE CRIME STUDY (2008), available at http://www.dnasaves.org/files/WASH
INGTON_STATE_PREVENTABLE_CRIME.pdf; DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
REQUIRING DNA FOR FELONY ARRESTS CAN SOLVE AND PREVENT VIOLENT CRIMES (2009),
available at http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Denver's%20Preventable%20Crimes
%20Study.pdf.
14
See CHICAGO STUDY, supra note 13.
15
Id.
16
See MARYLAND STUDY, supra note 13.
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arrestee DNA samples would provide a significant advantage in criminal
investigations and potentially in preventing crime.
While widespread DNA sampling can serve as an important tool in
fighting crime, it can also create tension with human rights concerns. In late
2008, the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) declared the U.K.’s
widespread collection and indefinite retention of arrestee DNA samples to be
a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.17 Even prior to
this holding, many human rights activists and commentators had expressed
concern about the potential violations of privacy that were occurring in the
U.K.18 Additionally, there were concerns that the U.K. databases were being
used to perpetuate racial discrimination. Further, commentators noted the
databases’ potential for future misuse, including accessing the stored
information for purposes other than criminal investigations.19 Finally,
statistics showed that the DNA profiles of many people who had either been
acquitted or never been charged in the first place remained in the databanks,
with authorities refusing to delete them. All of these concerns were brought
to light in the ECtHR’s 2008 ruling.
The purpose of this Note is to provide a comprehensive overview of the
developments in U.K. law in the field of forensic DNA databasing in light of
the United States’ recent foray into this area. As such, this Note will
examine the debate that surrounded the drafting and implementation of the
U.K.’s various statutes that allow for such widespread sampling and
retention of DNA profiles. Part II will focus on the particular statutes and
amendments that expanded DNA profile collection in the U.K. Specifically,
U.K. legislators adhered to no overarching legislative scheme; rather, the
ability to collect DNA profiles expanded over a number of years by way of
piecemeal legislation that gradually increased the police power to obtain and
retain DNA profiles.20 Part III will turn to the discourse that surrounded the
17

S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, [2009] Eur. Ct. H.R. (1581).
GENEWATCH UK, THE POLICE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE: BALANCING CRIME
DETECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 38–46 (2005), available at http://www.genewatch.
org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/NationalDNADatabase.pdf.
19
Id. at 12.
20
See generally ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, cm. 2263,
¶¶ 36–38 (U.K.) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT] (recommending DNA database);
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 172 (U.K.) (establishing National DNA
Database); Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act, 1997, c. 17, §§ 1–3 (U.K.) (allowing for
non-intimate sample to be taken from persons who committed a violent crime, sex offense, or
burglary prior to 1995); Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, c. 16 (U.K.) (allowing for the
indefinite retention of samples and fingerprints); Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 § 10 (U.K.)
18
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passing of those statutes and amendments, with a particular focus on how the
legislature conceptualized individual privacy rights and sought to balance
those rights with the original state interests. Part IV will analyze the
ECtHR’s decision in the case of S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, where the
Court held that the indefinite retention of arrestee DNA profiles violated the
Human Rights Act of 1998. In its analysis, the Court applied a balancing
test, attempting to strike the correct proportion between privacy protection
and advancing state interests in crime prevention.21 Finally, Part V of this
Note will examine the Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in
Maryland v. King and how this opinion differs from that of the European
Court of Human Rights. This retrospective look at the United Kingdom’s
initial venture into the world of DNA databasing provides a comprehensive
view of the various downfalls to avoid as the federal and state governments
within the U.S. attempt to refine their laws and employ DNA database
systems to their fullest capabilities, while simultaneously protecting what
privacy rights their citizens have. In light of the recent Supreme Court
decision, it appears as if the U.S. may have just taken the first step down a
road already traveled.
A. Background on Forensic DNA Analysis
In order to understand many of the topics and concepts embodied in this
Note, it is important to understand the mechanisms of forensic DNA
sampling and use. In 1985, Professor Alec Jeffreys of Leicester University
developed a method by which “patterns of chemical signals within the DNA
molecule” that are unique to each person could be identified and recorded.22
This form of identification, known as a DNA profile, soon began to be
recognized as a valuable tool in aiding criminal investigations and other
situations where determining identity was relevant, such as paternity suits.
In modern criminal investigations, DNA evidence is considered
biological physical evidence.23 When DNA sampling and analysis was first
used in this capacity, the early technology required a sizeable sample of
bodily fluid, such as semen or blood, in order to obtain a satisfactory
(allowing samples to be taken from any person arrested for a “recordable offence”—or any
offence which could result in imprisonment).
21
See S. & Marper, [2008] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581 at n.16.
22
Andrew Hall, DNA Fingerprints – Black Box or Black Hole?, 140 NEW L.J. 203 (Feb.
1990).
23
See GENEWATCH UK, supra note 18, at 11.
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profile.24 Today, with advances in DNA technology, analysts can often use a
technique known as “touch DNA” to generate a full profile with as few as
twenty dead skin cells.25
There are three main types of DNA analysis currently used to aid forensic
investigations: nuclear DNA analysis, mitochondrial DNA analysis, and YChromosome analysis.26 In all forms of DNA analysis, the process of
generating a DNA profile includes obtaining a piece of evidence likely to
contain DNA, isolating the DNA from that evidence, and then processing the
DNA to obtain a series of markers known as the DNA profile.27 The markers
are indicative of various alleles present at different locations (known as loci)
in the DNA chain, or genome.28
Current forensic DNA testing in the United States focuses on short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis, a form of nuclear DNA testing.29 In this type
of analysis, analysts evaluate specific loci found in nuclear DNA and create a
DNA profile that consists of thirteen loci in the DNA chain.30 The chances
of any two people (who are not identical twins) having the exact same
thirteen loci DNA profile is estimated to be as high as one in one billion or
more.31 While thirteen is the optimal number of loci, the FBI currently only
requires a profile with ten identified loci in order for that profile to be
uploaded into the National DNA Index System (NDIS) for forensic
purposes.32
Furthermore, the chain of markers used in forensic DNA identifications is
what is commonly referred to as “junk DNA.”33 That is, it does not involve
the full amount of information that a DNA sample could potentially hold
about an individual and thus is an unnecessarily limited use of DNA
sampling.
For instance, the DNA “fingerprints” used by criminal
24

Id. at 26.
Touch DNA, DNA FORENSICS, available at http://www.dnaforensics.com/touchdna.aspx.
26
DNA Evidence: Basics of Analyzing, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/
forensics/evidence/dna/basics/analyzing.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA
Index System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-an
alysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) [hereinafter CODIS FAQs].
33
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING, PREDICTIONS
OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 12 (2000), available at https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf.
25
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investigators today contain information about gender and the specific chain
of markers can be used as an identifier, but they do not contain information
about appearance, health, and behavior.34 These pieces of information can,
however, be found elsewhere in the genome, which has sparked some of the
controversy surrounding forensic DNA sampling.35
For the purposes of this Note, it is also important to understand the
distinction between a DNA sample and a DNA profile. A sample is the
physical specimen collected in order to generate a profile, i.e., blood, semen,
saliva, or skin cells.36 A profile, on the other hand, refers to the string of
numbers indicating which alleles are present at the loci.37 The profile is
generated by a DNA analysis of the sample. While a DNA profile derived
from the so-called junk DNA may not contain much more than identifying
information, a DNA sample may have much more information available for
analysis.38
II. THE U.K. LEGISLATION
The legislation that led the U.K. to the decision in S. & Marper v. United
Kingdom was not formed pursuant to some overarching legislative scheme.
On the contrary, the system, which came to govern the input and
maintenance of samples and profiles in the NDNAD, came about as a result
of several different pieces of legislation passed over the course of a decade.39
Each contributing piece of legislation is examined in more in depth,
beginning with the Recommendation of the Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice, which was the first body to recommend the establishment of a DNA
database and the use of DNA testing to aid criminal investigations. Each
section will also discuss what concerns, if any, were espoused about the
protection of privacy rights, or what general wariness was expressed at the
rapidly expanding system.

34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 61.
Id.
ANDREI SEMIKHODSKII, DEALING WITH DNA EVIDENCE: A LEGAL GUIDE 23 (2007).
See CODIS FAQs, supra note 32.
Id.
See discussion infra Part II.A–II.E.
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A. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice’s 1993 Recommendation
In 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice recommended that
the U.K. employ a DNA database.40 Their primary goal in adopting the
database was to achieve a “more objective form of forensic identification.”41
The Commission’s recommendation came as a result of several high-profile
cases involving quashed convictions that ignited public debate about the
criminal system and its effectiveness in achieving justice.42 The original
intent behind establishing a DNA database was to obtain a more reliable way
not only to secure convictions but also to narrow the field of suspects during
a criminal investigation.43 The Commission also recommended that police
should be able to take non-intimate DNA samples from those arrested for
serious crimes and that clear legislation was necessary to provide for more
extensive storage of DNA, both for the purposes of identifying offenders and
for keeping a database.44 The recommendation further stated that samples
could be obtained from those accused of serious offenses even where DNA
evidence was irrelevant to the offense, and such DNA could be retained for
further use if that person were to be convicted.45
The overall report of the Commission was lengthy, with numerous
recommendations for the improvement of the criminal justice system as a
whole.46 As a result, these two specific points were in large part overlooked
as they constituted some of the more minor recommendations of the
Commission. Public discourse seemed to focus on the Commission’s
proposed Criminal Cases Review Authority, which was a body made up of
lay members and lawyers and was intended to investigate alleged
miscarriages of justice.47

40

ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, ¶¶ 35–38.
GENEWATCH UK, supra note 23, at 26.
42
Terry Kirby & Heather Mills, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Reformers
Applaud Proposal for Body to Review Cases: New Authority Would Examine Possible
Miscarriages of Justice, INDEPENDENT, July 7, 1993.
43
See Carling, supra note 8.
44
See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 33.
45
Id. ¶ 34.
46
See generally id. (calling for researching jurors’ reasoning, reforming identification
procedures, setting guidelines for witness and victim interviews, among other
recommendations).
47
See John Wadham, Unravelling Miscarriages of Justice, 143 NEW L.J. 1650 (1993);
Siobhan M. Keegan, The Criminal Cases Review Commission’s Effectiveness in Handling
Cases From Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1776, 1801 (1999).
41
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B. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
In 1994, the NDNAD was established by the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act.48 In addition to establishing the NDNAD, this Act also amended
the definitions of intimate and non-intimate samples: classifying saliva,
swabs from any part of the body that is not an orifice, and non-pubic hair as
non-intimate samples.49 Significantly, different protocols governed the
collection of intimate and non-intimate samples; samples that were
considered non-intimate were easier to obtain. Amending the definitions had
the effect of allowing for the sampling of various substances that would
contain DNA on the basis that they were now considered non-intimate
samples. The division between intimate and non-intimate samples appears to
focus on the amount of physical invasion as opposed to the amount of
information gathered.
According to the amended definitions, intimate samples included
“a) . . . blood, semen, or any other tissue fluid, urine or pubic hair; b) a dental
impression; and c) a swab taken from a person’s body orifice other than the
mouth.”50 Arguably, one’s DNA profile contains much more information
about oneself than does a dental impression or even a fingerprint, since
dental impressions and fingerprints can only provide identification
information and DNA samples may contain information about race, sex,
family, and genetic disorders.51 The DNA sample, however, can be obtained
by less obtrusive means. For example, using current technology, a DNA
profile could be obtained with as few as twenty dead skin cells; obtaining a
sufficient sample size would be as simple as swabbing someone’s hand—
which is arguably even less physically invasive than a typical buccal (oral)
swab, dental impression, or collection of any type of bodily fluid, as it does
not require entry into any orifice.
Additionally, under this portion of the Act, there were still provisions for
the destruction of evidence, as well as restrictions as to how and when the
collected samples could be used in evidence.52 As discussed below, many of
the provisions for destruction of samples were slowly eroded over time. This

48
49
50
51
52

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, supra note 20, § 60A.
Id. § 58(3).
Id. § 58(2).
See DNA Evidence: Basics of Analyzing, supra note 26.
See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, supra note 20, § 57.
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is noteworthy, because indefinite retention of samples was one of the main
issues the Marper court was concerned about.53
C. The Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act
In 1997, an amendment to the Criminal Evidence Act extended the police
power to allow the collection of non-intimate body samples from certain
convicts without their consent.54 That is, non-intimate samples (as
previously defined by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act) could be
collected from persons convicted and detained at the time of enactment for
certain offenses, including any sex crime, violent crime, or burglary that had
been committed before the establishment of the NDNAD.55 This amendment
also allowed for the collection of non-intimate samples from children and the
mentally ill at the places where they were detained, provided they met the
requirements for the collection of the sample.56
The amendment enabled the collection of DNA samples from
approximately 7,750 sexual offenders, violent offenders, and burglars; their
profiles were subsequently put into the NDNAD.57 These changes to the
Criminal Evidence Act stemmed directly from the recommendations of the
Royal Commission.58 This bill was enacted for the purpose of “plug[ging]”
the “loophole” left by its predecessor, namely the lack of any provision
allowing for the collection of DNA samples from anyone convicted before
April 10, 1995.59
After some discussion in Parliament of the excellent advances in criminal
investigations directly attributable to the NDNAD and advances in DNA
technology, this bill was accepted with support from all sides of the House.60
In advancing the bill, Mr. Nigel Evans of the House of Lords noted six
benefits, including “the early identification of linked cases, the early arrest of
offenders, valuable intelligence, early exoneration of innocent suspects,
easier identification of bodies and, finally, deterrence.”61 Mr. Evans also
made note of the potential usefulness of a DNA database in solving so-called
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See S. & Marper, supra note 17.
Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act, supra note 20, §§ 1–3.
Id.
Id.
290 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1997) 1029-30 (U.K.).
578 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 105-112 (U.K.).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112.
288 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1997) 1230-31 (U.K.).
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“cold cases,” linking those already convicted of one crime to another, as yet
unsolved, offense.62
These six reasons comport fully with all of the reasons advanced by current
supporters of DNA sampling of arrestees and have been found by courts to be
compelling state interests.63 In a follow-up statement, Mr. Kirkhope, the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, spoke at
length on the six aforementioned interests served by expanding DNA
sampling.64 Mr. Kirkhope also spoke of “safeguarding . . . the interests of
innocent members of the public,” mentioning the security of the DNA
database, and the ability of DNA science to help eliminate innocent suspects
while simultaneously identifying perpetrators.65 While he further noted that
there is a possibility of error, Mr. Kirkhope asserted that the benefits of
expanding DNA testing outweighed any potential mistakes or undesirable
consequences in light of the precautions taken by the Forensic Science Service,
such as double testing samples when a match is reported and extensive
safeguards against contamination of samples.66
D. The Data Protection Act of 1998
The Data Protection Act, though it does not relate directly to the
operation of the NDNAD, specifies a number of “protection principles” that
must be met when certain types of personal data are collected and stored.
Three principles in particular are highly relevant to the topic of DNA
collection and retention. Notably: “Personal data shall be adequate, relevant,
and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are
processed”; data should not be kept for any time period longer than
necessary to achieve the purpose it was obtained for, and measures should be
taken to guard against the unlawful processing of personal data.67 Of
particular importance is the principle that data obtained for a particular
purpose shall only be retained for as long as necessary to achieve that
purpose.68 This provision is in direct conflict with the requirement adopted
62

Id.
Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1063–64, reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 404 (3d Cir. 2011); Why Pass the DNA
Law?, DNA SAVES, http://dnasaves.org/dna_law.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
64
See PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 61, at 1233–36.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, sch. 1 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
68
Id.
63
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in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Amendment that allows for the
indefinite retention of DNA profiles and samples.69
Furthermore, this Act was explicitly considered and passed in light of the
adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).70
During the Parliamentary debates on this particular bill, Baroness Nicholson
in the House of Lords discussed at length the fact that the U.K. had no
express right to privacy, which many of its citizens may have assumed they
had. She noted the arguments of Lord Lester, who claimed that in
incorporating the Convention, the U.K. had a “positive obligation” to create
a right of privacy.71
Mr. Lester’s comments arose during the debates surrounding a particular
clause of the Act that would greatly expand the police power.72 He proposed
that rather than relying on the dovetailing of U.K. common law with the
provisions of Article 8 of the Convention, it would be more desirable for
Parliament to affirmatively create a right to privacy.73 This, he argued, was
preferable to leaving that obligation to the courts, where they would be
forced to interpret the law, carving out a common law right of privacy.74
Mr. Lester further questioned the Solicitor-General as to whether the
adoption of the bill as-is would in fact violate Article 8 of the Convention.75
The confusing response was that the bill itself would constitute no such
violation, but that any order pursuant to the bill would have to be considered
in light of the Convention, and that the Government must be trusted to
exercise good faith in adhering to the principles of both.76 Put simply: the
response to concerns about the U.K.’s ability to comply with Article 8 of the
Convention without first establishing a statutory right to privacy in
Parliament was that they should “accept not only the Government’s good
faith, but whatever decision they reach” when a question arose under the
Convention.77
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E. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
In 2001, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), was
extended by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPO 2001).78 One
of the most significant changes that resulted from this extension was that it
allowed for the indefinite retention of all DNA samples and fingerprints,
where PACE had originally expressly prohibited such retention.79 The CJPO
only applied to England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland remained
free to destroy samples of those acquitted or those against whom the charges
had been dropped.80
Additionally, the samples of consenting volunteers who took part in mass
screenings would be retained indefinitely as well.81 Samples from volunteers
or those otherwise consenting to retention need not be destroyed pursuant to
other sections of the Act and had no restrictions upon the purpose for which
they may be used.82 Further, consent could not be withdrawn.83 In a sense,
samples that were voluntarily given were provided with less protection than
those obtained from suspected criminals.
As a purportedly limiting measure, Section 82(2)(1A)(b) of the Act
provides that retained samples “shall not be used by any person except for
purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of
an offence or the conduct of a prosecution.”84 As noted above, this conflicts
with the requirements of the 1998 Data Protection Act. Under that statute,
once a person has been acquitted of the crime with which they were charged
and the investigation is no longer ongoing, their personal information should
be purged from the system entirely. It was this section in particular that
would eventually lead to challenges under Articles 8 and 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.85
The difference between the number of samples destroyed or removed
from the database before and after the enactment of CJPO 2001 is startling.
From 1999 to 2001, 137,293 records were removed from the database,
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compared to only 70,035 records removed from 2001 to 2004.86 Samples
may have been destroyed and profiles removed from the NDNAD for the
following reasons: the individual died; the samples were taken in error; the
individual was acquitted or the charges against him were dropped; or the
records were duplicates.87
In December 2003, an estimated 109,000 profiles belonging to those who
had been acquitted remained in the NDNAD.88 Of those who had voluntarily
given their DNA samples, approximately 10,500 profiles were in the
database.89 This subset primarily includes people who were asked to provide
a sample as a result of an intelligence screening exercise conducted by law
enforcement when an offender was believed to live nearby.90
F. The Criminal Justice Act Extension
Finally, in April 2004, certain provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
went into force, allowing for the collection and indefinite retention of
samples from all persons arrested for any “recordable offense” who had been
taken to a police station in connection with that offense.91 In other words,
regardless of whether a person was ever charged or convicted, his or her
DNA sample was obtained once he or she was detained at the police station,
and that sample could be kept and cross-referenced indefinitely.
In the Parliamentary debates surrounding this extension, an amendment
allowing for the destruction of samples and fingerprints in certain situations
was considered and rejected.92 In arguing against the amendment, Baroness
Scotland, then Minister of State for the Criminal Justice System and Law
Reform, took note of the approximately 103,000 DNA profiles in the
NDNAD which would have previously been deleted from the system due to
an acquittal.93 Of these, over 4,500 profiles were matched to crime scene
samples, including the samples taken from “26 murders, 15 attempted
murders, 27 rapes, 13 sexual offences, 14 aggravated burglaries and six of
the supply of controlled drugs.”94 She used these statistics to argue that
86
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reverting back to a system that deleted the DNA profiles of acquitted persons
would be an undesirable step backwards in the use of DNA as an
investigative tool. Still, this argument disregards the approximately 99,000
profiles of acquitted persons that were never matched to any sort of crime or
criminal investigation.95
III. THE PRIVACY DEBATE
In the late 1990s and early 2000s all these pieces of legislation enjoyed a
great deal of public support. The public had professed general safety
concerns and, on the whole, people seemed concerned about the police not
catching the right criminals or not catching as many criminals as they
could.96 In fact, in 1994 the Secretary of State for the Home Department
commented on the establishment of protocols for collecting DNA samples
for criminal investigations:
Almost all the correspondence we have received has been
supportive of our proposals to allow DNA samples to be taken
in all recordable offences. The police have warmly welcomed
our plans. They help bring the law into line with the
capabilities of modern technology. The full force of modern
science will be brought to bear upon the modern criminal.97
However, as early as 2002 the tides of public opinion began to shift as DNA
technology rapidly advanced and the databanks began to expand. Human
rights groups in particular expressed growing concern about the future of
DNA testing and privacy rights, including how the databanks would or could
be misused in the future, given that the U.K. did not until very recently have
a recognized right to privacy.98
A. Development of the Right to Privacy in the United Kingdom
U.K. common law does not recognize a right to privacy.99 Some
commentators have extrapolated from this that because there had been no
95
96
97
98
99
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statutory or otherwise enumerated right to privacy the NDNAD could not
possibly have violated such a right.100 However, this statement ignores the
implication of the Human Rights Act of 1998, which formally incorporated
the European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. law.101 Article 8 of the
Convention explicitly states: “Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life.”102 The Convention was integrated into U.K. law the
same year that the Data Protection Act was passed, and a mere four years
after the establishment of the NDNAD.103 The adoption of both of these
statutes indicates an awareness and acceptance on the part of Parliament that
citizens do have some sort of privacy right and that certain precautions
should be taken in order to avoid violating that right.104
Furthermore, questions about a right to privacy in the U.K. arose in many
different contexts even before the adoption of the Convention.105 Notably,
the notion of an officially recognized right to privacy first experienced a
great deal of discussion in England in the context of paparazzi and famous
figures.106 Many of the arguments against recognizing a separate right to
privacy revolved around the notion that such a right was already protected by
the law of confidence.107 The law of confidence, briefly put, protects private
information from being publicly disseminated to the detriment of the party
whom the information concerns.108 Others argued that the law of confidence,
though it provided protection in some areas, did not go far enough.109 One
such proponent, Lord Keith, stated that “the right to personal privacy is
clearly one which the law should in this field seek to protect.”110
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The right to privacy was discussed in other contexts as well. In the
context of sophisticated surveillance techniques such as software that logs
keystrokes used to monitor employees in the workplace, one commentator
from the U.K. noted that “[i]n a democratic society, privacy remains a basic
right of citizens.”111 Of course, she adds that there will always be conflict
among enumerated rights—the difficulty lies in determining the correct
balance.112 Thus, the question of privacy rights and the correct balance to be
struck concerning those rights was still open at the time that legislation
regarding DNA databases was adopted.
B. NDNAD and Arrestee DNA Considered in Light of the Privacy Debate
Around 2002, the debate about the potential of arrestee DNA samples to
constitute privacy intrusions began to intensify. There was some public
concern that DNA profiles were not used to their full advantage, which is
indicated in the legislative history of the extension of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984.113 This concern stemmed primarily from two cases in
which DNA evidence was able to link suspects to a rape and a murder. In
those cases, the DNA profiles were not able to be used against the suspects
because the offenses which led to their collection failed to result in a
conviction.114
In direct contrast, however, was growing concern on the part of human
rights groups that the expanding use of DNA samples was, or could be, a
violation of privacy.115 After acknowledging that Article 8 of the
Convention allowed for a recognized right to privacy, many were of the
opinion that the use and retention of DNA samples did not violate that right.
Section 8(2) states, in part, that no public authority should interfere with the
right to respect for a private life “except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety . . . [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime.”116
The argument was that since the express goal of the systematic collection of
DNA was crime prevention, there was no violation of the Convention.
111
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In 2002, Baroness Hale disagreed with the holding of the House of Lords
in the case of S. & Marper v. United Kingdom.117 She indicated in her
dissent that the retention of both fingerprints and DNA data constituted a
violation of a person’s right to a private life.118 Information about an
individual’s genetic make-up, she reasoned, could be the absolute most
private information one could possibly obtain about a person.119 However,
she agreed with the majority opinion that the government had provided
sufficient justifications for the use and retention of DNA information in that
particular case.120
Also in 2002, there were growing concerns about the ethnic makeup of
the samples retained by the NDNAD. Notably, ethnic minorities were
disproportionately represented in the NDNAD, indicating that the database
may be biased against minorities who tend to make up the majority of the
convicted population.121 There were several proposals for how to combat
this apparent discrimination. The inventor of the DNA fingerprint was
reportedly alarmed at the discriminatory practices that surrounded the use of
his technique, and called for the creation of a national database that would
store the profiles of every citizen in the U.K.122
In her comment in the New Law Journal in 2002, B. Mahendra also
argued that the most effective way to battle a disproportionate (and thus
seemingly discriminatory) amount of minorities in the NDNAD was to
institute a national DNA database and to incorporate national genetic identity
cards.123 Mahendra brushed off “slippery slope” type arguments, saying that
to give credence to such arguments is to remain “blind to the workings of the
modern world.”124 However, Mahendra’s argument holds little water. First,
she writes that one should lay aside any ethical or moral arguments
concerning invasions of privacy and preservation of civil liberties.125 Later,
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however, she claims there is no convincing argument based on civil liberties
against a national database.126 According to her, citizens have a “right to
justice and the duty not merely to assist the authorities but also [their] fellow
citizens,” and it is these rights and duties that trump any right to privacy.127
In early 2005, GeneWatch U.K. issued a report proposing limitations on
the use and functions of the NDNAD, as there were serious concerns about
future misuses of the system.128 The concerns included discrimination,129
‘function creep,’130 expansion of the databank to include the entire
population,131 increasing “back door” use of DNA databases that were
initially established for health or research purposes,132 and the possible
linkage of multiple government databases.133 On the subject of retaining the
profiles and samples from unconvicted persons, the report asked “[A]re we
citizens or suspects?” Considering that the NDNAD essentially creates a
subset of people who are continuously under suspicion, despite potentially
having never been convicted of any offense, GeneWatch U.K. argues that
this may serve to “subtly alter” the way in which these people are viewed by
their government or even by other citizens.134
In response to the argument that only the guilty have anything to fear, the
GeneWatch U.K. report made reference to historical accounts of the misuse
of citizen information by communist and fascist regimes throughout
Europe.135 GeneWatch U.K. reasoned that the fact there was no indication of
wrongdoing was not a good enough argument for the expansion of the
database; the potential for wrongdoing was enough.136 Furthermore, the
“nothing to hide” argument proceeds on the premise that valuing privacy is
about hiding a wrong. While privacy is a difficult, perhaps impossible,
notion to succinctly define, it encompasses such a range of ideas that it is
safe to say that a desire for privacy does not necessarily stem from a guilty
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conscience. The “nothing to hide” argument, while strong on its face,
crumbles under scrutiny.
The GeneWatch U.K. report also indicated ways in which DNA profiles
might be misused in the future. Specifically, it cited the possibility of
attempts to use DNA sequences to predict ethnicity and using current
NDNAD profiles to determine where a suspect may come from.137
Depending on how a person views DNA sampling and retention, this could
be considered either a powerful investigative tool or another way in which
racial discrimination could be (and, in the view of some, is being)
perpetuated.138
Additionally, the GeneWatch U.K. report included some statistics on
what happens once someone is arrested by the police. While the survey was
outdated, having taken place in 1993–1994, the results shed light on the
implications of a DNA database as widely used as the NDNAD.139 In that
time frame, 1.75 million people had been arrested for both recordable and
non-recordable offences.140 Over one third of the arrestees had been detained
for “relatively minor public order offenses” and only four percent had been
arrested for the “most serious violent crimes.”141 Of those arrested, only
forty percent were eventually convicted.142 Thus, of the persons arrested
during that two-year period, over one million were never convicted.143
Perhaps even more importantly, only fifty-two percent of suspects were even
charged. The rest of the arrested persons either had no further action taken
against them, were cautioned and released, or their charges were dealt with
in “various other ways.”144
In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair indicated his support for a national
DNA database, saying it was “vital for catching serious criminals.”145
Echoing these sentiments in 2007, Lord Justice Sedley espoused his belief
that the NDNAD should be expanded to include the DNA profile of every
citizen in the U.K. in order to avoid discrimination against ethnic

137

Id. at 31.
Id. at 49.
139
Id. at 41.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
George Jones, DNA Database ‘Should Include All,’ TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2006), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1532210/DNA-database-should-include-all.html.
138

178

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:157

minorities.146 Both men were met with resistance in Parliament from both
the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives and the database was never
expanded that far.147
In 2007, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics issued a report (the Nuffield
Report) strongly advocating against the government’s then-current proposals
for further expanding the power to take DNA samples.148 The Nuffield
Report advanced arguments regarding proportionality, costs of the system,
and addressed the commonly advanced argument that “those who are
innocent have nothing to fear.”149 Their response was even more concrete
than that posited in the GeneWatch U.K. report. In addition to the “what if”
response indicated in GeneWatch, the Nuffield Report referenced the actual
harm that can be suffered by an individual who is merely the subject of
police suspicions.150 Even without an arrest or investigation leading to a
conviction, persons involved in a police investigation may be distressed
throughout the process and stigmatized in society by mere association with a
criminal investigation.151
Second, the Nuffield Report indicated that maintenance of the national
database could actually hinder the pursuit of criminal justice. As a practical
issue, the Nuffield Report noted that “fewer than 20% of crime scenes”
actually undergo any type of forensic examination152 and recommended that
instead of increased sampling and retention of DNA, resources should be
focused on fully examining crime scenes and other types of investigative
work.153 Further, the report claimed that a national DNA database, as
advocated by some, would not only be hugely expensive, but it would in fact
have a very small effect on national crime rates.154 Despite claims that the
collection and retention of DNA samples aids the prevention of crime, the
crime rates in the U.K. have not shown a marked improvement.155
Third, the Nuffield Report warned that DNA evidence used during court
proceedings sways juries a great deal, even though it may utilize science and
146
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statistics that jurors do not actually understand.156 Like several other
detractors, the Nuffield Report noted that the NDNAD could further
exasperate problems with governance and ethical oversight, dangers of
inferring ethnicity, and racial discrimination in criminal justice systems that
already experience an ingrained type of discrimination.157
Fourth, the report showed concern over the fact that, in the U.K., children
were treated the same as adults for the purposes of the NDNAD.158 In 2005
there were roughly 740,000 persons in the database whose samples were
obtained when they were under the age of eighteen.159 Traditionally,
criminal justice systems are more lenient on minors and treat them as equals
to adults in only a handful of situations, often decided on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, the inclusion of minors in the database in the same manner as
adult records are obtained and kept is troubling.
Finally, with respect to volunteer samples and samples that were given
with consent of the donating party, the Nuffield Council recommended that
they not be held indefinitely; instead, the consent should be conditional and
revocable.160 Individuals who had provided samples in order to aid a specific
criminal investigation should be able to condition the retention of their
profiles on the duration of the investigation for which the sample was
given.161 Allowing this would permit those citizens to remove themselves
from the pool of potential suspects, rather than treating volunteers the same
as arrestees and convicts.
In light of the many issues identified, the final recommendation of the
Nuffield Report was that police should only be allowed to retain the DNA
information about persons who were convicted of a crime.162 It noted in
particular that the police power with regards to collecting and retaining DNA
samples and other types of personal information was already comparatively
broad in England and Wales.163 Prior to the final recommendation of the
U.K. government to further expand those powers, the Nuffield Report
strongly advocated abandoning proposals that would allow for the collection
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and retention of DNA samples for something as simple as littering and minor
traffic offenses.164
Instead, the authors of the Nuffield Report indicated that the Scottish
practices regarding DNA were a preferable alternative.165 In Scotland (which
was not affected by some of the legislation expanding the retention of
samples and profiles in the NDNAD),166 only the samples of those “charged
with serious violent or sexual offences” could be retained without a
conviction.167 Even then, the samples could only be kept for three to five
years.168 Profiles and samples taken in connection with other recordable
offences would require a conviction in order to be maintained in the
databank.169 It is in the face of these growing concerns and arguments
against the widespread use of the NDNAD, and with extraordinary
technological advances being made in the field of DNA identification, that
the European Court for Human Rights heard the pivotal case of S. & Marper
v. United Kingdom.
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ DECISION IN S & MARPER V.
UNITED KINGDOM
S. & Marper v. United Kingdom was the critical case in which the ECtHR
ruled that the indefinite retention of DNA profiles from persons arrested but
never convicted of a crime constituted violations of the Convention.170 In
each of their cases, both S. (name excluded because he was a minor at the
time of arrest) and Marper had been arrested but never convicted.171 S. had
been arrested at the age of eleven for robbery, and Marper was arrested for
harassment of his partner.172 S. was acquitted of the charges against him and
the case against Marper was discontinued.173
Each defendant petitioned the police to have their DNA samples and
fingerprints destroyed, but these requests were refused.174 When they took
164
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their respective challenges to the Administrative Court, S. and Marper were
rejected there as well.175 The Court of Appeal, in upholding the decision of
the Administrative Court, determined that “DNA profiles reveal only limited
personal information.”176
The ECtHR began its opinion by noting that “privacy” had never been
exhaustively defined in English law.177 The court determined, therefore, that
privacy can include multiple elements of one’s identity, including health
information and ethnicity.178 It further found, unequivocally, that all three
categories of information at question in the case (fingerprints, DNA profiles,
and cellular samples) are personal data such that they fall within the purview
of the Data Protection Act 1998.179
Further, in holding that the indefinite retention of DNA samples of
unconvicted persons constituted a violation of the Human Rights Act, the
court found that DNA samples contain a “substantial amount” of personal
data, particularly considering the ability to identify the possible perpetrator
of a crime from examining the DNA of his family members.180 The ECtHR
determined that the retention of these samples interfered with the petitioners’
rights to a private life.181 The court also noted that the U.K. was the only
member state of the Council of Europe that expressly permitted the indefinite
retention of DNA and cellular samples of people who had never been
convicted of a crime.182
Depending heavily on its opinion in Van der Velden v. the Netherlands,
the court focused on how the information contested in this case might be
used, or misused, in the future.183 Van der Velden concerned cellular
material; there, the court considered that, “given the use to which cellular
material in particular could conceivably be put in the future, the systematic
retention of that material was sufficiently intrusive to disclose interference
with the right to respect for private life.”184
The ECtHR further held in Marper that the indefinite retention of
personal information contained in cellular samples constitutes a per se
175
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interference with the right to respect for a private life.185 The fact that
authorities only use a limited portion of the information contained in those
samples was of no consequence to the Court’s ruling.186 Even considering
the difference between samples and profiles, the court noted that DNA
profiles “contain substantial amounts of unique personal data” that go far
beyond only providing information about identity.187 As support for this
proposition, the Court noted the ability of a DNA profile to identify familial
relationships or ethnic origin.188
In 2010, in the aftermath of the ECtHR’s ruling, the U.K. changed the law
to specify that acquitted citizens’ DNA profiles collected during an
investigation of a crime may only be retained for a maximum of six years.189
While some commentators argue that the new incarnation is still a violation
of the HRA,190 it has yet to be overruled. Additionally, even though the
DNA records of unconvicted persons were removed from the system, records
of arrest remain and the law allows these arrest records to remain accessible
indefinitely.191
V. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES’ DECISION IN
MARYLAND V. KING
The case of Maryland v. King involves petitioner Alonzo King who was
arrested in 2009 on assault charges.192 Upon arrest, King underwent a buccal
swab for collection of his DNA as part of routine booking procedure in
Maryland.193 His DNA was linked to a rape that had occurred in 2003 and he
was convicted on those charges.194 King challenged this conviction on the
185
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basis that the collection of his DNA incident to his arrest for assault was an
unreasonable search and seizure.195 The Supreme Court upheld his
conviction, finding the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In
doing so, it may have taken the first step towards more comprehensive DNA
collection and retention laws, allowing the United States to follow the
footsteps of the United Kingdom into a mire of privacy violations.
The Maryland statute on DNA collection (the Act) provides for the
collection of DNA from arrestees who are charged with violent crimes,
burglary, attempted violent crimes, and attempted burglary.196 Once the
sample is collected, it may only be uploaded to a database after the accused
has been arraigned.197 The Act does contain a number of safeguards. For
instance, it allows for the immediate destruction of any samples if the
accused is acquitted, the conviction is reversed, or the defendant is
pardoned.198
The Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, mentioned each of the
aforementioned safeguards. However, the Court never indicated which of
these safeguards, if any, were essential to its holding that a search and
seizure pursuant to the Act constituted a reasonable invasion of privacy given
the state interests to be served.199 The state interests advanced by the King
Court strongly resemble some of those advanced by advocates of the
NDNAD in the U.K., including: identification of potential criminals,
ensuring the safety of those charged with detaining arrestees, ensuring the
presence of the accused at trial, assessing the danger a person may pose to
the public at large, and freeing the wrongfully accused.200 These are strong
state interests and the use of DNA in criminal investigations in furtherance of
these interests is indisputable. However, the Court focused heavily on these
end goals, noting the “unmatched potential of DNA identification”201 to
serve them, but glossed lightly over the privacy interests at stake.
There are two prongs to assessing the reasonableness of a search: the
level of invasion or intrusiveness of the search and the person’s legitimate
expectations of privacy.202 Beginning with the level of intrusion necessary to
195
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198
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200
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202

Id.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAF. § 2-504(a)(3)(i).
Id. § 2-504(d)(1).
Id. § 2-511(a)(1).
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979–80.
Id. at 1971–74.
Id. at 1977.
Id. at 1977–79.

184

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:157

obtain a DNA sample, Justice Kennedy assures the reader that a buccal swab
is a minimal intrusion; a simple swipe of the cheek is in no way comparable
to invasive surgery, or even as invasive as some other normal booking
procedures.203 Next, the opinion addresses the arrestee’s “legitimate
expectations of privacy.” It is well-settled that persons who undergo an
arrest supported by probable cause have a reduced expectation of privacy.204
The opinion indicates that the sampling of one’s DNA is not as invasive or
potentially revealing as a search of one’s home.205 However, this view is
flawed.
The Court in this case focuses on the importance of DNA profiles for the
identification of an accused. In its review of the amount of information
contained in a DNA profile, the opinion glosses over the ability to determine
ethnic origin or familial relationships.206 It compares a DNA profile to a
photograph or a fingerprint,207 both of which are capable of revealing much
less information about a person than is a DNA profile. The Court thus
frames DNA profiles as nearly harmless intrusions upon a person who has a
diminished expectation of privacy because they have already been suspected
of some sort of wrongdoing.
In his blistering dissent, joined by Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor, Justice Scalia heavily criticizes the majority opinion’s reliance
on the fact that DNA is used only for identification.208 He notes that
fingerprints and photographs are taken for purposes of identification; DNA is
taken for purposes of solving crimes.209 He appreciates that this is a noble
objective, but argues that it must fall to other more important goals,
including protecting citizens from suspicionless searches.210 Justice Scalia’s
premonition is simple: “As an entirely predictable consequence of [this]
decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database
if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”211
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Thus, a likely long-term consequence of this opinion will be a U.S.
equivalent to the NDNAD.
Bolstering this conclusion is the apparent breadth of the decision itself.
The majority in this case notes that its decision will implicate the DNA
collection statutes in every state that has such legislation, yet it issues a broad
opinion that offers little guidance to state legislatures or lower courts. By
treating DNA as a simple identification tool, the Court simply puts off the
decision of what limits there must be to DNA collection, retention, or use.
More importantly, without noting which of the safeguards found in the
Maryland Act are essential to the legitimate protection of privacy, the Court
opens the door for a multitude of DNA collection and retention statutes that
range in their levels of protection. In stressing the importance of the state
interests to be served and diminishing the far-reaching capabilities of
forensic DNA analysis, the Court has opened the door for the U.S. to
legislate itself into the same predicament that the U.K. was in by 2008.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the early days of using DNA as an investigative tool, governments
were optimistic about the ability of this new technology to help solve and
potentially prevent crime. It was, and remains, one of the most powerful
tools available to those involved with criminal investigations. In the U.K.,
this optimism, combined with public approval and a lack of a clearly defined
right to privacy, enabled the creation and evolution of one of the largest and
fastest growing DNA databases in the world. Over the course of a decade,
the U.K. continuously passed legislation that expanded its police power in an
unprecedented fashion.
As the U.K. government became more industrious in its cataloguing of
personal information, the public and various human rights groups became
concerned with the system’s potential to violate personal privacy rights.
Eventually, the ECtHR held that the U.K. had surpassed its limits and ruled
that the indefinite retention of DNA samples and profiles from unconvicted
persons was a violation of international human rights law.
The ECtHR hinged its decision on the unlimited time span for which
personal information could be retained by the government, the nature of the
information that could be gleaned from a DNA sample or profile, and the
difficulties innocent people face in getting their records erased from the
national database. As a direct result of this ruling, profiles of unconvicted
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persons are no longer allowed to remain in the U.K. databases indefinitely,
irrespective of the claimed governmental interest in preventing crime.
While the U.K. is different from some democratic societies in that it has
no statutory or constitutional right to privacy, other countries may be well
served by considering the evolution of laws regarding DNA databases in the
U.K., as well as the ruling and reasoning of the ECtHR in Marper, in
fashioning their own arrestee DNA legislation or databases. In the United
States, of the twenty-eight states that allow for the collection of DNA upon
arrest, only seven also require state-initiated expungement; the rest specify
that it is the citizen’s responsibility to initiate expungement proceedings.212
Requiring citizen-initiated expungement can be problematic for many
reasons, such as the time involved in obtaining a court order and
socioeconomic factors that may disproportionately prevent one class of
people from navigating the legal system in an attempt to get a court order,
among others. Considering the additional required time and costs of
obtaining a lawyer to assist with procuring the necessary order for
expungement, most citizens are unlikely to go through the process necessary
to have their DNA profile removed from the databases. This, in turn,
translates to more and more profiles of exonerated or acquitted persons being
retained in the DNA databases—the exact practice the ECtHR took steps to
eliminate.
As the United States strives toward using DNA technology to its full
advantage without violating the rights of citizens, it may be useful to
consider the findings of other high courts, as well as the overall evolution of
DNA legislation in other countries. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Maryland v. King found that a simple buccal swab to obtain a DNA sample
for the purposes of identification of a person arrested for a serious offense
was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. While the
Maryland law in question in King had many of the safeguards desired by
privacy rights advocates and mentioned by the ECtHR, the Court’s decision
was not expressly limited to those statutes with similar protective measures.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court views DNA profiles primarily as a
mode of identification, and it did not concern itself with future potential uses
or the potential for familial searches. Many would argue that this is an
oversimplification of the true utility of DNA profiles and databases, but that
is an argument that the Court is sure to see again. It is highly likely that
DNA collection statutes will continue to proliferate in the United States, and
212
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the Court will face challenges to the scope of such statutes in the future.
While the decision in Maryland v. King may be reminiscent of the strong
support DNA collection and retention initially enjoyed in the U.K., it
remains to be seen if the United States will allow the establishment of a
system as far-reaching and comprehensive as the NDNAD.
An individual’s right to privacy and right to be free from unnecessary
government interference—the “right to be let alone—are core values not
only of the American legal system, but also of American culture.213 In this
country and in any other country considering arrestee DNA sampling and
retention, legislation should always be considered in light of the statistics
surrounding arrestee DNA sampling, the potentially inadequate safeguards
against sample retention in cases that result in nonconviction, and the
difficulties many would face in getting their records expunged if the process
is not state-initiated. Otherwise, arrestee DNA databases across the world
may experience a fate similar to that of the NDNAD in the U.K.—
continuously strengthened until the system infringes on any number of
human rights.
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